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Introduction
This paper will report on the law and policy project 
being conducted at the Australian National University, 
jointly by the ANU College of Law and the Fenner 
School of Environment and Society. It will report on 
this research conducted so far, and identify the next 
steps in the research program. Other projects are  
also reporting in this special issue of AJEM. 
Is emergency management 
mainstreamed into law?
Emergency management has traditionally been seen 
as the responsibility of the emergency services, such 
as fire brigades and the state emergency services. 
Vulnerability, and the ability to protect life, property 
and other assets, is, however, largely defined by 
activities and policy settings in other sectors. This 
interplay of policy means that fire and emergency 
management should be seen as a whole-of-
government and cross-sectoral issue. To mainstream 
emergency management is to consider how other 
policy sectors impact upon the community’s ability  
to prepare for and respond to various hazards.
Our research has identified that:
… fire management considerations are 
relevant in many policy sectors, suggesting 
that emergency management is a mainstream 
consideration but the strength of emergency 
management mainstreaming is not clear (Eburn 
and Jackman, 2011, p. 74).
In order to further ‘mainstream’ emergency 
management into broader policy and law, and to 
determine the priority of emergency management, 
or in other words, the ‘strength’ of emergency 
management considerations, clear objectives have  
to be identified:
Policy interventions are intended to achieve 
goals in relation to identified problems, and it 
would be expected that goals would be clearly 
expressed in policy statements, and form 
the reference point for later implementation, 
monitoring and review (Dovers, 2005, p. 101).
Australian governments have not, however, given  
a clear statement of what emergency management, 
across the Prevent, Prepare, Respond and Recover 
spectrum, is meant to achieve. The National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience says a ‘disaster resilient community 
is one that works together to understand and manage 
the risks that it confronts’ (COAG, 2009) but that does 
not give any measure by which we can determine 
whether or not resilience has been achieved.
Australians will always be subject to natural hazards 
– floods, bushfires, cyclones and the like. As the 
fires from 2003 and 2009, the floods and storms of 
2010/11 and floods again in 2011/12 show, Australian 
communities are very resilient to natural hazards 
having the resources to prepare for, and recover from 
such devastating events. Making ourselves more 
resilient, more flood and fire proof may be possible, but 
not without cost. As we strive for further evidence of 
resilience it may be reasonable to ask ‘How prepared is 
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prepared enough?’ (Jongejan et al, 2011), and how much 
are we prepared to pay, and forsake, for extra gains in 
community resilience? Costs we will have to pay are:
• Economic – every dollar spent on hazard reduction 
is a dollar not spent on some other social good and 
with diminishing returns, at some point we will get 
better returns from spending the money on the 
other community good, but at what point? Within the 
emergencies sector, there are trade-offs between 
different activities (e.g. fuel reduction, building 
improvements, community education, response 
capacities). How those trade-offs are to be made 
depends on what the objective is.
• Social – ensuring that all the bush is cleared 
around high risk communities, or that people live 
away from the coast and the threat of storm surge, 
or that people are limited in what and how they 
build on their properties will change the nature of 
communities and society generally; and
• Environmental – undertaking hazard reduction 
activities such as fuel reduction burning or building 
coastal protection infrastructure can have dramatic 
impacts on the natural environment.
Our research concluded that:
Deciding how competing demands will be 
assessed and balanced requires a clear view 
on what are the policy objectives; that is what 
is emergency management policy meant to 
achieve? … Until there is a clear and specific 
goal or objective of emergency management 
policy, it is impossible to identify how that  
policy can be mainstreamed or the success  
(or otherwise) of the policy measured. Whatever 
objectives are selected, different legal and 
policy tools will be required to achieve them.  
A clear, specific and measurable goal may 
be “No one will die in a bushfire” but that will 
lead to a very different policy response than 
if the goal is to ensure that “There will be no 
bushfires.” (Eburn and Jackman, 2011, p. 74).
The need for clear policy objectives was also referred 
to by former Australian Federal Police Commissioner, 
Mick Keelty, in his review of the 2011 Perth Hills 
Bushfire. As a result of that fire, no lives were lost  
but many people were evacuated and homes were  
lost. Keelty said: 
There remains one question the answer to 
which eluded the Special Inquiry but it is an 
answer that requires further examination and 
that is: What is the measure of success of the 
outcome of a bushfire? Is the loss of no lives the 
only performance measure? If so, how many 
houses is an acceptable number to lose? Does 
one performance indicator have the potential to 
cloud the ‘Shared Responsibility’ of all to build 
resilience of our community? (Keelty, 2011, 
Transmission Letter p. 3).
Measures of success
The next stage of our research will consider the 
question posed by Mr Keelty: ‘What is the measure of 
success of the outcome of a bushfire (or any hazard)?’ 
This will bring our research back to the question 
asked when we first began to consider if, and how, 
emergency management can be mainstreamed into 
law. The critical issue remains ‘what are the objectives 
of emergency management policy?’ Only when the 
objectives are identified can we determine what 
success looks like and what measures may be used to 
determine if there is, or is not, a successful outcome. 
It is not apparent that the social, political and thereby 
broader social goals of emergency management are 
clear or widely-understood. In an area of intense 
December 3, 2001: Firefighters in the Perth suburb of Trigg tackle flames metres from residential houses.
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community, media and political scrutiny and interest,  
a lack of clarity can lead to unproductive argument  
and an inability to agree on necessary improvements 
to current policy and management arrangements.
To gain insight into these issues we interviewed  
fire and emergency service chief officers from nearly 
all Australian States and Territories and asked them 
‘what do they understand is the measure of success 
that should be used in Australia?’ The interviews 
covered a number of related issues that influence  
this question.1 At the time of writing, interviews 
with sixteen emergency service leaders have been 
conducted. The results of those interviews are still 
being analysed. The discussion, below, offers some 
preliminary findings: more detailed analysis will be 
reported at a later date.
It is recognised that emergency management is  
much more than emergency response, it covers 
the entire Prevent, Prepare, Respond and Recover 
spectrum. It is understood that vulnerability to natural 
hazards including bushfires and flooding, is affected 
by decisions made across government sectors, not 
just emergency responders, so for example, decisions 
by local governments and state planning agencies 
affect our ability to prevent the impact of floods on 
homes or to prepare to face the fires that will come 
out of the Australian bush. Some aspects of these 
cross-sectoral decisions and their impact on living 
with hazards are being addressed by colleagues at 
the University of Canberra (on urban and regional 
planning) and RMIT University, Melbourne (on shared 
responsibility). Although recognising that the voice 
of the fire and emergency service chiefs are but one 
voice, representing as they do the ‘response’ agencies, 
it is believed that their views on law and policy and the 
objectives that can be realistically achieved, will help 
inform the broader public policy debate.
The chief officers recognise that preserving  
life is a fundamental objective of the emergency 
services but it remains an aspirational goal.  
The emergency environment is dynamic, fast moving 
and unpredictable. An unpredictable variable is human 
behaviour. People will make decisions that will turn  
out to be wrong in the circumstances that occur,  
and deaths will follow. It follows that loss of life is a 
tragedy that the services seek to avoid, but the fact 
that people die during a bushfire or flood does not 
necessarily represent a failure by the emergency 
services: 
… the zero death rate should always be 
aspirational. It should always be an aspirational 
goal. So you always push towards it but accept 
the inevitability of the event as well and then try 
and narrow the gap. 
… that loss of life is tragic but at times 
unavoidable in these operations… I think if 
everyone has gone above and beyond their limits 
and really done everything they could practically 
and conceivably do in the circumstance, I don’t 
think that’s failure. I think there’s space to learn 
or improve or change, but is it failure? No. I don’t 
think so. I just don’t think it is. 
We can then ask ‘If the answer to the question  
‘Is the loss of no lives the only performance measure?’ 
is ‘no’, what might be the measure of success?’  
One suggested measure is to measure the emergency 
response against plans and procedures. The argument 
would be that if the emergency services did all that 
they had planned to do, if they had responded in 
accordance with standards and procedures that 
had been developed in the calm before the storm, 
with appropriate community consultation and taking 
into account important community considerations 
including impact on life, economic well-being and the 
February 7, 2011: Perth, WA. Bushfires seen burning at night close to houses in the Perth suburb of Kelmscott in 
Western Australia.
1.  These interviews were undertaken within the Human Research Ethics protocols of the Australian National University, which place strict conditions 
on use of the material to protect the anonymity and interests of the interviewees.
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environment, then they would have had a successful 
response even if, tragically, some people died.
Most interviewees indicated a disjunct however, between 
a lack of clarity in overarching goals (e.g. to preserve life) 
and detailed operational procedures and plans:
… lawyers are writing the plans … They are 
so prescriptive as to be almost irrelevant 
… what we’re trying to do is manage these 
environments legally by saying, well, you need 
to tighten up this and tweak that, and write a 
procedure for that, and close that list off, and 
make sure all the documentation completely 
minimises any exposure to risk.
Well, that’s great, but then you’ve got the 
documents and then you’ve got the environment 
which you’ve got to operate it within. I’m yet to 
be convinced that the two will ever align. So, 
you know, tighter document control or more 
prescription … probably protects the minister 
and protects the government … But is that 
helping me as an incident controller? Probably 
not one little bit. It’s probably forcing me to be 
so paranoid about the doctrine that I won’t be 
able to use my initiative and my experience and 
my intuition in an operation. 
 The South Australian Deputy State Coroner has noted:
… one can always find fault in a setting of 
such complexity. The temptation to criticise 
the minutiae of every decision that was taken 
by a group of individuals or by the individuals 
themselves is sometimes difficult to resist. 
(Schapel, 2007, p. xiv).
Or, in other words, ‘The best laid schemes of mice 
and men; Go oft astray’ (Burns, 1785), or ‘… no plan 
survives contact with the enemy’ (von Moltke, u.d).
In a setting as complex as a developing fire, flood or 
storm event, errors must be made, even if they are 
only identified as errors when the consequences have 
been identified and the presence of hindsight bias 
makes what was merely a possible outcome, look as if 
it was always inevitable and foreseeable (Maguire and 
Albright, 2005, p. 53). Accordingly if one were to set up 
‘compliance with operational procedures and plans’ as 
a measure of success, then an agency is doomed  
to fail.
Further, as many interviewees noted, set procedures 
must be interpreted by experienced staff and 
sometimes varied with good reason. However justified, 
this would allow criticism of not following procedures 
at some later point. If emergency responders slavishly 
obey procedures rather than adapt to changing 
circumstances, in order to avoid later scrutiny and 
criticism, the results in terms of lost lives and property 
may well at times be worse than it otherwise would 
be. If we aim to have procedures manuals that are 
completely prescriptive, there will be no room for 
professional judgment or experience; the only skill 
incident controllers will need is the ability to read 
(Eburn, 2012).
It is often tempting, when designing a system to 
measure success, to focus on measuring what is easy 
to measure. Annually, the Productivity Commission 
provides a Report on Government Services. In the 
context of the emergency services they measure such 
things as response times, number of fires contained 
to the room of origin, the number of deaths and the 
dollar value of property losses, and the number of 
households with smoke alarms and emergency plans 
and service staffing and funding levels (Productivity 
Commission, 2012, pp 9.2-9.32). These measures 
focus attention on response agencies and local 
communities and households. However, in the context 
of mainstreaming and the issue of success measures, 
other actors play an important role. These include 
local and state agencies that determine planning and 
development, agencies that place infrastructure and 
other assets in the landscape that require protection, 
and communications and health services providers. 
Should the Productivity Commission also measure 
such things as the ‘number of houses built in at-risk 
locations per year’? 
Many chief officers took the view that it would be 
appropriate to measure success by comparing the 
actual losses with potential losses, that is to measure 
the ‘outputs’ rather than the ‘inputs’. The Commission 
does provide some ‘output measures’ (the value of 
property losses, the number of people killed etc) but 
these are raw numbers, without context. As one chief 
officer said ‘…we are very scant on outcome measures. 
That’s largely because … the outcome measures are 
quite difficult to measure.’
January 17, 2005. The search investigating the 
deliberately lit fires on Mount Dale in Pickering 
Brook, Perth. 
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In terms of the 2009 Black Saturday fires, 173 people 
tragically died, but as a non-Victorian chief officer said: 
… we need to get better at measuring what we 
save. … if you look at the extent of the impact 
and how many people could have potentially 
died, and how many people were in that area 
and didn’t die… That to me is probably quite 
successful... 
 
So that 173 people dead sounds big, and it is, 
but … if they said, look, 15,000 people were 
directly impacted by this fire and tragically we 
lost 173. It still sounds bad but at least there’s a 
bit of context around it.
Another, also a non-Victorian, said:
… five million people or something in Victoria 
and you’d say 173 from five million is … as good 
as it gets and nobody is prepared to stand up 
and say that and I don’t think anybody could 
actually stand up and say 173, what a really 
good outcome that was. But the reality of it is, 
is it probably might have been as good as it gets 
because it’s about what are people prepared 
to sacrifice … we might be able to prevent fires 
in the rural landscape from occurring, all we 
have to do is concrete over everything. But are 
people going to be prepared to accept that, 
are they going to be prepared to live in that 
environment? No, they’re not. So we have to say 
there is a risk associated with doing anything, 
and the risk is that there be lives and properties 
put at risk.
Excellence, or perfection, cannot be the measure of 
success; ‘Whilst one always strives for excellence, 
excellence is not to be equated with absolute 
perfection’ (Schapel, 2007, p. xiv). Perhaps the only 
measure of success is:
… passing the scrutiny of an intelligent and 
reasonable critic…. all you can hope for is that 
reasonable people, reasonable, intelligent 
people and dispassionate people are fine that it 
went reasonably well under the circumstances 
and there were no large systemic failures.
Not that there was a perfect outcome, not that it could 
not have been better, but that ‘it went reasonably well 
under the circumstances and there were no large 
systemic failures.’
Conclusion
This paper has reported on research being undertaken 
at the Australian National University on Mainstreaming 
Fire and Emergency Management across Legal and Policy 
Sectors: Joint Research and Policy Learning. 
We have determined that there is a depth of emergency 
management mainstreaming, that is emergency 
management considerations are relevant in a number 
of areas of law, but the strength of that mainstreaming, 
how important those considerations are and whether 
they take priority over other factors is unclear, 
suggesting that mainstreaming is ‘weak’. 
July 15, 2009: Marysville, VIC. Marysville Patisserie reopening in Glenferrie Road, Malvern after the original was 
destroyed during the bushfires. Owners Ashraf and Christine Doos carry out the original sign from the destroyed shop 
still covered in ash. The sign is the only thing they managed to save from the fire-razed patisserie. Pic. David Caird.  
The Marysville Patisserie recently re-opened in Marysville.
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We are now returning to our first question about 
mainstreaming emergency management. We cannot 
effectively incorporate emergency management 
considerations into other areas of law and policy 
until we determine what we are trying to achieve. 
We will, with further analysis of our research data 
and supported by reference to legal and political 
principle and theory, make further contribution to 
the discussion that the community has to have about 
what it is we are trying to achieve. Are we trying to 
meet the aspirational goal of zero deaths, or the goal 
of communities, and agencies and interests outside 
the emergency sector, that understand and appreciate 
their risks and understand that, at the end of the day, 
they need to answer the question ‘What are you going 
to do about it?’
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